O sistema sindical

Juntando-se a um sindicato.

Um sindicato é uma organização com membros que geralmente são trabalhadores ou empregados. Ele cuida de seus interesses no trabalho, fazendo coisas como:

Negociar acordos com os empregadores sobre salários e condições que discutem grandes mudanças, como redundância em grande escala, discutindo as preocupações dos membros com os empregadores que vão com os membros para reuniões disciplinares e de queixas.

Encontre uma união para participar.

Se houver um sindicato no trabalho, você pode perguntar ao representante do sindicato ("representante") sobre a adesão. Seus dados de contato podem estar no manual da sua empresa, no site da intranet ou no quadro de avisos do sindicato.

O representante do sindicato dirá se você está qualificado para participar e fornecer um formulário de associação para preencher.

Detalhes de contato do sindicato.

Você pode pesquisar uma lista de sindicatos e seus detalhes de contato juntos pelo oficial de certificação, a organização independente responsável pela regulamentação legal dos sindicatos.

Você também pode usar a ferramenta interativa do TUC para ajudá-lo a encontrar um sindicato em seu local de trabalho ou um que cubra seu tipo de trabalho.

Assinaturas de filiação sindical.

Seu sindicato cobrará uma taxa de filiação sindical ("subscrição de filiação") para financiar o trabalho do sindicato. Esse valor pode ser o mesmo para todos os funcionários ou com base em quanto você é pago.

Pagando seus subs.

Você pode pagar seus subs por:

tendo o valor recebido pelo seu empregador do seu pagamento e enviado para o sindicato (também conhecido como "check-off"), cheque em dinheiro de débito direto.

Pagando pelo check-off.

Seu empregador não precisa receber subscrições de sindicato do seu pagamento e enviá-lo ao sindicato. Eles podem parar de enviar seus subs associados, a menos que seu contrato de trabalho diga que eles precisam.

O seu empregador não pode receber subscrições de sindicatos do seu pagamento sem a sua permissão por escrito. Muitos sindicatos conseguirão o seu acordo para pagar por check-off quando você entrar, e encaminhá-lo para o seu empregador.

Você também pode pedir ao seu empregador, por escrito, que pare de receber dinheiro do seu pagamento para o check-off sempre que desejar. Eles devem, então, parar de receber subs do seu pagamento assim que possível.

Seu empregador é responsável por garantir que os pagamentos de check-off sejam legais.

O que fazer se você tiver um problema.

Se você tiver algum problema com seus pagamentos de check-off, tente discutir o assunto com seu empregador e seu sindicato primeiro.

Se as suas assinaturas de sindicato forem retiradas de seu pagamento sem o seu consentimento, você poderá fazer uma reclamação em um tribunal trabalhista contra seu empregador.

Se a sua reclamação for bem sucedida, o tribunal do trabalho pode ordenar ao seu empregador que lhe pague o valor dos pagamentos não autorizados.

: Associação sindical: seus direitos trabalhistas.

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Sindicatos.

Apenas cerca de um quinto dos funcionários na Alemanha são sindicalizados e a densidade sindical caiu acentuadamente desde o início dos anos 90, em parte devido a uma queda acentuada no emprego industrial na Alemanha Oriental após a unificação. A grande maioria dos sindicalistas está na principal confederação sindical, a DGB, mas dentro dela sindicatos individuais, como IG Metall e Verdi, têm considerável autonomia e influência.

Existem cerca de 7,4 milhões de sindicalistas na Alemanha. No entanto, isso inclui um número substancial de membros aposentados do sindicato, agora 20% do total e crescendo. Como resultado, a base de dados de afiliação sindical do ICTWSS colocou a densidade sindical em 18,0% em 2011. 1.

A principal confederação sindical na Alemanha é a DGB, que visa recrutar todos os tipos de trabalhadores. É de longe a maior confederação e os sindicatos filiados a ela contam com 6.104.851 membros (2014) 2.

Os sindicatos da DGB enfrentam concorrência significativa de sindicatos não membros do DGB no setor público e nos setores públicos anteriores, onde outra confederação, a dbb, possui 1.282.829 membros (2014) 3. Há também uma pequena confederação cristã, a CGB, que afirma ter 280.000 membros. 4

Além das confederações sindicais, existem sindicatos autônomos para ocupações específicas, como médicos de hospitais (Marburger Bund), pilotos de linhas aéreas (Cockpit), comissários de bordo (UFO) e controladores de tráfego aéreo (GdF). Alguns têm uma adesão significativa. O Bund Marburger informou que tinha 114.179 membros no final de 2012. 5 [1] Cockpit afirma em seu site que tem cerca de 9.300. 6 [2] (O sindicato de motoristas de locomotivas GDL, que muitas vezes é incluído nesses sindicatos, é de fato um afiliado do dbb.)

Tradicionalmente, os sindicatos da DGB foram organizados principalmente em bases industriais, com sindicatos para trabalhadores metalúrgicos, trabalhadores químicos, funcionários do setor público, finanças e varejo e assim por diante. A estrutura criada quando o DGB foi criado em 1949 permaneceu praticamente inalterada por muitos anos. No entanto, desde o início da década de 1990 houve uma série de grandes fusões, que mudaram fundamentalmente o quadro.

Existem agora dois sindicatos - IG Metall e Ver. di - de tamanho similar. O IG Metall é novamente o maior, com 2.269.281 membros (final de 2014) 7. Embora a grande maioria de seus membros ainda esteja no setor metalúrgico, fundiu-se com a união têxtil em 1997 e a união de madeira e plásticos em 1999. Também possui membros no setor de informação e comunicações.

O Ver. di foi criado em 2001 a partir de uma fusão de cinco sindicatos, cobrindo transportes e uma variedade de serviços públicos, varejo e finanças, correio e telecomunicações, setor gráfico e de mídia e uma confederação não manual, a DAG, que anteriormente fora do DGB. Por um período após a fusão, foi o maior sindicato do DGB, mas, após as perdas de associados, está agora em segundo lugar, com 2.039.931 membros (final de 2014). O Ver. di procura organizar trabalhadores de serviços tanto no setor privado quanto no público.

O terceiro maior, com 657.752 membros (final de 2014), é o IGBCE, que abrange os trabalhadores químicos e de energia, cujos sindicatos se fundiram, juntamente com um pequeno sindicato para a indústria do couro, em 1997.

Essas uniões individuais são muito poderosas e certamente têm mais recursos do que a própria DGB. (Os únicos membros reais do DGB são os oito sindicatos que pertencem a ele.) As fusões também mudaram o equilíbrio de poder para os sindicatos individuais, pois os três maiores respondem por 81% do total de membros do DGB.

O dbb é composto de 43 sindicatos, cada um cobrindo uma área específica do setor público ou antigo setor público, como professores em colégios vocacionais ou aqueles que trabalham para a polícia de fronteira alemã. Os dois maiores sindicatos são o sindicato de professores VBE e komba, um sindicato de funcionários administrativos do governo local.

A maioria dos membros dos sindicatos dbb são empregados em serviços públicos com status especial (Beamte), cujos salários e condições são estabelecidos por lei e não negociados. 8 Mas também organiza trabalhadores com direitos trabalhistas normais - cerca de um terço do total - e negocia para muitos deles através da tarifação dbb (agora integrada ao dbb). Um dos mais industrialmente poderosos sindicatos do dbb é o sindicato de motoristas de locomotivas, o GDL, que esteve envolvido em uma longa disputa industrial em 2007. No final de 2010, a outra afiliada do dbb na indústria ferroviária, a GDBA, fundiu-se. com uma afiliada da DGB, Transet, a primeira vez que ocorreu uma fusão entre confederações. O novo sindicato fundido, chamado EVG, que no final de 2014 tinha 203.875 membros, se juntou ao DGB.

O Christian CGB é composto por 14 sindicatos separados dos quais o mais importante é o sindicato CGM dos metalúrgicos. No entanto, os tribunais determinaram em uma série de casos que esses sindicatos não têm a capacidade (em termos de filiação ou organização) para celebrar acordos coletivos (ver seção sobre negociação coletiva).

Politicamente, a DGB enfatiza sua neutralidade formal e garante que pelo menos um membro de seu executivo nacional seja membro da CDU democrática cristã. Há também alguns membros da CDU em posições de liderança em sindicatos individuais. No entanto, tradicionalmente, a posição geral dos sindicatos e da maioria dos dirigentes sindicais está mais próxima do SPD social-democrata, embora haja também algumas figuras importantes que apóiam os Verdes, e as autoridades sindicais de nível intermediário desempenharam um papel na criação do sindicato. Linkspartei de esquerda.

A constituição do dbb também afirma que é independente em termos político-partidários e confessionais. É tradicionalmente visto como mais conservador que o DGB, embora o atual presidente não pertença a nenhum partido e seu executivo inclua membros do SPD. O CGB, em contraste, afirma que é guiado pelo ensino social cristão, que considera que só pode ser alcançado através de uma organização sindical separada.

A filiação sindical geral caiu drasticamente desde a unificação alemã. A DGB foi gravemente afetada, perdendo quase metade (48%) de seus membros desde o seu pico em 1991, quando tinha 11,8 milhões de membros. Isto apesar de absorver um grupo sindical previamente separado para trabalhadores não manuais (o GDA com 460.000 membros) através da criação do Ver. di em 2001. (A filiação à antiga Alemanha Oriental, que inicialmente era alta, caiu muito o emprego lá declinou.) Nos últimos anos, a participação se estabilizou, com uma queda geral de apenas 1,4% entre 2010, quando foi de 6.193.252, e 2014, quando foi de 6.104.851. Quatro sindicatos cresceram ligeiramente no mesmo período, incluindo o maior, o IG Metall. 8

Os números do dbb mostram que seus membros cresceram 1,7% no período de 2010 a 2014, de 1.276.330 para 1.282.829 9. A adesão ao Marburger Bund (médicos) aumentou 16% entre 2006 e 2012, de 98.033 para 114.179. 10

A filiação sindical é mais forte entre os trabalhadores manuais na manufatura e nos serviços públicos, mas muito mais fraca entre os trabalhadores do setor de serviços privados. Entre os sindicatos da DGB, 33,1% dos sindicalizados são mulheres e 66,9% homens (valores para o final de 2014). No DBB, 31,8% dos membros do sindicato são mulheres e 68,2% são homens (2014).

A economia.

Operando como um mercado único com 28 países, a UE é uma importante potência comercial mundial.

A política económica da UE procura sustentar o crescimento através do investimento em transportes, energia e investigação - minimizando o impacto de um maior desenvolvimento económico no ambiente.

Medir a economia da UE.

A economia da UE - medida em termos dos bens e serviços que produz (PIB) - está à frente dos Estados Unidos. PIB da UE em 2015:

Com apenas 6,9% da população mundial, o comércio da UE com o resto do mundo representa cerca de 20% das exportações e importações mundiais.

Mais de 62% do comércio total dos países da UE é feito com outros países da UE.

A UE é um dos três maiores players globais do comércio internacional, ao lado dos Estados Unidos e da China. Em 2014, as exportações de bens da UE foram equivalentes a 15,0% do total mundial. Eles foram superados pela primeira vez desde que a UE foi fundada pela China (15,5%), mas ainda estavam à frente dos Estados Unidos (12,2%), que tinham uma participação maior nas importações mundiais (15,9%) do que a UE. (14,8%) ou China (12,9%).

Emprego.

O emprego também foi atingido pela crise econômica global e pela turbulência na zona do euro.

Força de trabalho empregada na agricultura.

Percentual de pessoas ocupadas na indústria (excluindo construções) em relação a 2010 (2010 = 100)

Os dados não estão disponíveis para países da UE que não aparecem no menu suspenso.

Os dados não estão disponíveis para países da UE que não aparecem no menu suspenso.

A pesquisa e o desenvolvimento (P & D) estão no centro da estratégia da UE para tornar sua economia mais competitiva. O objetivo é investir mais para alinhar seus gastos em P & D com os dos Estados Unidos e do Japão.

Gastos totais em P & D como porcentagem do PIB.

Não há dados disponíveis para alguns países e / ou setores.

Os objectivos da UE são promover redes de transportes eficientes, seguras e respeitadoras do ambiente.

A proporção de viagens feitas de carro aumentou ligeiramente desde 2008 - em comparação com outras formas de transporte rodoviário (como ônibus e ônibus). A UE continua a apoiar o investimento e a reestruturação do transporte ferroviário.

Apesar da atual crise econômica, o transporte aéreo global deve crescer cerca de 5% ao ano até 2030. À medida que o tráfego aumenta, também aumentam as preocupações com a segurança. A política de aviação da UE pretende tornar o espaço aéreo europeu o mais seguro do mundo.

Transporte de passageiros por via rodoviária, ferroviária e aérea.

Transporte aéreo de passageiros.

Energia e meio ambiente.

A UE importa mais de 50% das suas necessidades energéticas.

Percentagem de electricidade produzida a partir de fontes de energia renováveis.

Dependência líquida de importações de energia como porcentagem do consumo total.

As tarefas dos sindicatos.

Publicado pela primeira vez: Comunista Trade Union Library No. 3, fevereiro de 1920.

Fonte: Dimitrov, Georgi, Selected Works Vol. 1, Sofia 1972.

1. OS SINDICATOS NO PASSADO.

Os sindicatos surgiram durante o estágio inicial do capitalismo como uma organização destinada a melhorar as condições econômicas dos trabalhadores no âmbito do sistema capitalista existente. A princípio, consideraram como tarefa lutar apenas contra os capitalistas individuais em defesa dos interesses imediatos dos trabalhadores profissionais, sem afetar os fundamentos da exploração capitalista e sem ultrapassar o limite da organização social industrial capitalista.

A abolição da competição entre trabalhadores de um determinado comércio, o acesso restrito de novos trabalhadores a ele e o recurso em casos extremos a greves - esses eram os métodos usuais usados ​​pelos antigos sindicatos para obter salários mais altos, menos horas de trabalho e melhores condições de trabalho.

Na falta de ver a ligação direta que existe entre a condição dos trabalhadores na produção e a organização política e estatal da sociedade capitalista, esses sindicatos, um exemplo clássico dos quais encontramos nos antigos sindicatos britânicos, fecharam-se em sua concha profissional estreita, evitando assiduamente toda a participação em batalhas políticas e na política do país em geral, e limitando-se a questões relativas ao seu ofício. Isto, obviamente, não impediu que eles fossem usados ​​com frequência, direta ou indiretamente, para os fins políticos da burguesia.

Apesar desse caráter inócuo dos primeiros sindicatos, a burguesia e seu Estado se opuseram veementemente e julgaram pela violência, pela repressão e pelas proibições legalizadas para destruí-los, sentindo instintivamente que poderiam se transformar em perigosas organizações de classe, em órgãos da luta de classes. o proletariado pela abolição do sistema capitalista.

Os violentos atos de violência, repressões e proibições contra os sindicatos, no entanto, não conseguiram produzir o resultado esperado pela burguesia. Produto do próprio desenvolvimento do capitalismo, surgido na luta entre capital e trabalho e tendo se tornado uma necessidade vital para os trabalhadores em sua defesa contra a exploração capitalista, os sindicatos não poderiam ser erradicados. As perseguições contra eles apenas intensificaram as contradições de classe existentes na sociedade capitalista e as revelaram mais claramente às massas de trabalhadores. Sem a intervenção dos sindicatos, as greves foram mais frequentes, espontâneas e turbulentas, causando danos imensuráveis ​​à produção, ameaçando muitas vezes até a segurança pessoal e a propriedade dos capitalistas individuais.

Foi precisamente isso que finalmente obrigou a burguesia a se reconciliar com a existência de sindicatos, enquanto tentava domá-los e transformá-los em organizações que regulassem as relações entre trabalhadores e capitalistas e mantivessem uma paz duradoura na indústria.

A burguesia britânica, que durante muito tempo dominava o mercado internacional e possuía as maiores e mais ricas colônias do mundo, tinha amplas possibilidades de atingir certos objetivos materiais para os sindicatos, que compreendiam principalmente os qualificados, para a consecução desse objetivo. trabalhadores, a chamada aristocracia trabalhista.

Isto marcou o início da era dos contratos coletivos, celebrados entre os sindicatos e as organizações capitalistas e fixando por consentimento mútuo as condições e taxas de salários e tempo de trabalho, eliminando assim por muito tempo o perigo de greves nas empresas e nos ramos da indústria afetados por esses contratos coletivos. Estabeleceram-se as conhecidas escalas salariais, de acordo com as quais as taxas salariais eram determinadas de acordo com o preço médio das necessidades básicas durante um determinado período, sendo, no entanto, calculadas de modo a manter os salários no nível mais baixo possível. E a fim de envolver mais profundamente os trabalhadores e seus sindicatos na produção capitalista, para atraí-los e torná-los ávidos colaboradores dos capitalistas para gastá-lo e estabilizá-lo, a fim de aumentar ao máximo o lucro capitalista, muitas empresas recorreram ao lucro. sistemas de partilha, sob a forma de certas percentagens e bónus concedidos aos trabalhadores. Assim, os capitalistas asseguraram uma máxima eficiência laboral por parte dos trabalhadores, salvaguardaram-se contra as suas greves, embolsaram grandes lucros, enquanto tudo o que os trabalhadores conseguiam era a ilusão de participar nos lucros das empresas e, se inadequada, de não atribuí-la à exploração capitalista, não à ganância dos capitalistas, não ao sistema capitalista de produção em si e ao modo como os bens produzidos eram distribuídos, mas à sua própria inadequação no trabalho, ao seu fracasso esforços necessários para o sucesso da produção.

Adotando essa política industrial em relação aos trabalhadores, os capitalistas se esforçaram para fazê-los acreditar que uma melhoria de sua condição poderia ser alcançada não através de greves, não através de uma luta contra a exploração capitalista, mas somente através de um aumento de capital, através da expansão da produção. através de lucros capitalistas em constante crescimento.

E a maioria dos sindicatos na Grã-Bretanha e em vários outros países, de órgãos de defesa dos interesses dos trabalhadores e de combate ao capitalismo, foram transformados em veículos para o estabelecimento do equilíbrio e da paz na produção capitalista e para um instrumento do sindicato. capitalistas da nação, por meio do qual manter as massas dos trabalhadores em um estado de subordinação e escravidão, para desviá-los do caminho da luta proletária de classe e sempre para opor-los à revolução dos trabalhadores emancipatórios.

E quando, em meados do século passado, após a fundação da Primeira Internacional Socialista 1) e a publicação do Manifesto Comunista por Marx e Engels, o proletariado começou rapidamente a se organizar como uma classe própria e o movimento sindicalista adotaram cada vez mais a visão de Marx de que os sindicatos não deveriam limitar-se a uma guerra partidária contra capitalistas individuais e à tarefa sísifa de cortar os galhos sem tocar o tronco da exploração capitalista, mas deveriam tornar-se escolas de socialismo e se esforçar para abolir o próprio capitalismo Ao desempenhar um papel primordial na guerra civil para sua queda, a burguesia adotou uma política de longo prazo e sistemática de subornar e corromper os líderes sindicais e a numerosa burocracia sindical, a fim de manter o movimento sindical sob sua influência.

Na sua imprensa, lisonjeava os líderes sindicais como sendo inteligentes e talentosos representantes dos trabalhadores, instigava-os a virem para os seus suntuosos banquetes, cortejavam-nos de várias formas, concediam-lhes todo o tipo de benefícios, ajudavam-nos a entrar no parlamento e os mantinham firmemente suas mãos.

Deve-se admitir que, dessa maneira, a burguesia conseguiu com muita freqüência alcançar seu objetivo e manter sob controle direto ou indireto muitos dos sindicatos, circunstância essa que fez o uso mais amplo possível, em particular durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial.

2. OS SINDICATOS DURANTE A GUERRA.

Posicionando-se nas posições dos capitalistas de sua nação, a maioria dos sindicatos britânicos, as mais antigas e mais fortes organizações sindicais, viam na guerra o único meio pelo qual a indústria na Grã-Bretanha seria capaz de preservar sua posição dominante no mercado. o mercado mundial agora ameaçado pelo crescente e agressivo capitalismo alemão, e por manter seu domínio sobre a Índia e as outras ricas colônias, que lhe forneciam matérias-primas e vastos mercados para seus produtos.

E os sindicatos britânicos colocaram-se a serviço completo da política imperialista e belicosa de sua própria burguesia. Eles tentaram impedir todos os ataques, prolongaram os prazos de vencimento de todos os contratos coletivos e se esforçaram para garantir o desenvolvimento mais amplo possível da indústria da guerra. Eles deram um grande número de voluntários entre eles e abriram escritórios especiais para o recrutamento de voluntários para o Exército Britânico e, quando o serviço militar obrigatório foi introduzido na Grã-Bretanha, onde nunca havia existido no passado, eles não só não se opuseram. mas aplaudiu entusiasticamente essa iniciativa de Lloyd George como um meio "excelente" de esmagar para sempre "o militarismo prussiano".

Os sindicatos alemães, por sua vez, chefiados pelo notório traidor social Legien e pelos numerosos funcionários da burocracia corrupta dos trabalhadores, anunciaram que a guerra do imperialismo alemão contra o "pérfido Albion" (Inglaterra) era ao mesmo tempo um guerra pela existência da classe trabalhadora na Alemanha, que se esta fosse derrotada nesta guerra, até mesmo as poucas colônias que ela possuísse corn pared com a Grã-Bretanha seriam tiradas dela, que a indústria alemã seria privada das matérias-primas de que precisava, suas estradas para os mercados internacionais seriam bloqueadas e seriam levadas a um completo desastre e, junto com ela, a classe trabalhadora seria reduzida a miséria e pauperismo sem precedentes e a Alemanha - como Lênin gostava de dizer - ' em vez de exportar mercadorias, estaria exportando homens vivos sua mão de obra.

O Comité Geral dos Sindicatos 2) dirigiu um ardente apelo aos trabalhadores da indústria e do exército, instando-os a dar o seu apoio global à "guerra defensiva sagrada" do Kaiser Wilhelm 3) e aos imperialistas alemães, e exigindo os sindicatos para fazer com que os trabalhadores se abstenham de todas as greves, especialmente no campo da mineração e das indústrias de guerra.

Foi assim que a "paz civil" entre a classe trabalhadora e a burguesia imperialista foi solenemente proclamada. No exato momento em que os capitalistas alemães e suas sociedades anônimas estavam embolsando bilhões de lucros, quando a chuva de ouro da guerra estava despejando em seus cofres, os proletários alemães estavam derramando seu sangue nos campos de batalha ou trabalhando dia e noite na indústria. para a "defesa da pátria", enquanto seus sindicatos investiram seus milhões em dinheiro (arrecadados ao longo de décadas em centavos de trabalhadores para combater a exploração capitalista) em empréstimos estatais para financiar a pérfida guerra.

Acompanhando o canto do hino raivoso dos imperialistas alemães e militaristas 'Deutschland, Deutschland fibre alles', 4) os grandes líderes sindicais publicaram um livro especial, contendo artigos dos secretários dos vários sindicatos que, com números relativos à sua produção ramos, esforçou-se por provar a necessidade de a Alemanha se extinguir até ao fim na guerra e da sua soberania como completa vencedora, declarando orgulhosamente que isso inevitavelmente seria conseguido, porque a guerra da parte da Alemanha era uma guerra que a classe trabalhadora era lutando por sua existência e sua felicidade futura. Eles entusiasticamente - pintaram as brilhantes perspectivas de uma vitória militar para os trabalhadores alemães que poderiam viajar livremente pelo mundo inteiro, recebendo altos salários e desfrutando da maior prosperidade.

Ao mesmo tempo, a AFL 5 de Gompers estava realizando uma propaganda muito intensiva para a intervenção dos Estados Unidos na guerra e, quando essa intervenção se tornou um fato, mobilizou todas as suas forças a serviço dos milionários e corporações americanas.

Mesmo os sindicatos franceses que, sob a influência do anarco-sindicalismo 6) eram considerados inimigos extremos e irreconciliáveis ​​do capitalismo, em sua maioria se comprometeram, por razões semelhantes, ao serviço do capital financeiro francês na guerra, enrolaram suas bandeiras e abraçou de todo o coração a política da "paz civil".

Sem nos determos na traição dos sindicatos das outras nações beligerantes, com exceção daqueles na Rússia, Itália, Bulgária, Sérvia e Romênia, que permaneceram completamente leais à classe trabalhadora e à solidariedade internacional proletária, podemos afirmar corajosamente hoje que, se a Os capitalistas dos dois blocos beligerantes puderam acender o holocausto da guerra mundial e conduzir seus povos a ele, se conseguissem manifestar tais forças titânicas durante seus quatro anos de duração, isso se deveu principalmente ao fato de que eles conseguiram bom momento para conquistar os sindicatos que tinham muitos milhões de membros em sua causa imperialista e colocá-los a serviço de sua política militar de conquista.

O velho oportunismo e auto-sindicalismo no movimento sindical; a política de limitar sua atividade a reformas dentro do sistema capitalista; a estreiteza profissional, a falta de visão e a corrupção da burocracia sindical; a educação das massas dos trabalhadores nos sindicatos, em um espírito de ganhos pequenos e momentâneos ao longo do caminho do entendimento mútuo com os capitalistas - tudo isso se desenvolveu e se manifestou brilhantemente durante a guerra na forma de um imperialismo operário que solidariedade internacional do proletariado e transformou os trabalhadores dos diferentes países em inimigos mortais que se matavam mutuamente pela causa de seu inimigo comum - a capital mundial.

Isto, no entanto, prova a completa bancarrota da política oportunista dominante no movimento sindical na maioria dos países, desnudando perante o proletariado mundial e suas organizações operárias com absoluta clareza o único caminho salutar - o caminho da luta de classes intransigente, ao longo do qual Temos o prazer de dizer que nossos próprios sindicatos têm marchado incessantemente desde o dia de sua fundação até hoje.

3. RESULTADOS DA LUTA DOS SINDICATOS.

Com os métodos comerciais de luta, os sindicatos nos diferentes países conseguiram, de fato, alguns resultados. A arbitrariedade despótica do patrão em relação aos trabalhadores nas empresas era restrita. Os trabalhadores conquistaram o direito de intervir, por meio de seus sindicatos, no estabelecimento de relações entre trabalho e capital. Também se obteve um aumento no nível salarial médio em comparação com as condições anteriormente miseráveis ​​do trabalhador, bem como com as jornadas de trabalho mais curtas, que no passado os capitalistas podiam prolongar livremente até os limites fisicamente mais amplos possíveis.

Além disso, os montantes gastos pelos sindicatos durante os períodos de desemprego não só aliviam o grande número de desempregados como também ajudam a evitar a intensa competição entre desempregados e empregados, impedindo assim a redução dos salários e a antiga deterioração irrestrita das condições gerais de trabalho. .

É claro que os benefícios derivados da luta dos sindicatos costumam recair sobre os trabalhadores qualificados e semi-qualificados, que são aqueles precisamente em posição de estabelecer sindicatos fortes, enquanto a massa de trabalhadores não qualificados, em geral, goza desses benefícios, mas pequeno.

Quão insignificantes, em geral, no entanto, os resultados obtidos pelos sindicatos ao longo de muitos anos de esforço e luta podem ser claramente vistos pelo fato de que, mesmo nos países capitalistas mais desenvolvidos, como Grã-Bretanha, Alemanha e América, os salários Antes da guerra, sempre havia o mínimo necessário para o sustento elementar dos trabalhadores, enquanto o dia de trabalho na maioria dos ramos da indústria era dez, e só aqui e ali oito horas.

Os ganhos da luta sindical são, além do mais, não apenas insuficientes do ponto de vista das necessidades materiais, culturais e espirituais da classe trabalhadora; eles também são precários.

Os capitalistas têm à sua disposição vários meios de contrabalançar os esforços dos sindicatos, visando melhorar as condições de trabalho, bem como despojá-los dos frutos de sua luta. A política geral do Estado, assim como as condições em que a produção capitalista está se desenvolvendo, facilita sua tarefa a esse respeito.

Assim, aproveitam, sobretudo, as possibilidades oferecidas pelo progresso técnico, introduzindo e ampliando o uso de mulheres e crianças na produção. Estas, devido ao seu menor poder de resistência e menor susceptibilidade à organização, geralmente competem com os trabalhadores adultos e tendem a deprimir as condições de trabalho.

Para o mesmo propósito, os capitalistas usam os trabalhadores das regiões atrasadas e países cuja cultura é menor, assim como os desamparados e áridos pequenos e burgueses urbanos e rurais que, devido aos seus meios restritos, estão prontos para trabalhar em termos inferiores aos que os sindicatos venceram.

Compelidos a reduzir o dia de trabalho, os capitalistas agora conseguem tirar dos trabalhadores, mesmo durante as horas de trabalho mais curtas, tanto de sua força vital como antes, através do trabalho de peças e os diferentes sistemas especiais de utilização de cada movimento do corpo do trabalhador enquanto ele está no trabalho. Um caso em questão é o bem conhecido sistema americano, conhecido como o sistema de Taylor, que, no entanto, inevitavelmente leva à rápida degeneração física dos trabalhadores e a um encurtamento de sua capacidade de trabalho.

Finalmente, o que os sindicatos conseguem ganhar através de sua luta profissional na forma de salários mais altos, em geral é tirado deles no momento seguinte, como conseqüência da política capitalista geral e, em particular, a introdução e o aumento da renda indireta. impostos, taxas de importação e outros meios similares que tendem a elevar o custo de vida.

Todas essas condições especiais de luta sindical há muito tempo sugeriram aos elementos mais avançados e clarividentes da classe trabalhadora que essa luta deveria ser travada de maneira isolada, que ela deveria ser coordenada com a luta política geral do proletariado. que uma greve na produção deve ser combinada com a votação e a luta no parlamento, assim como com todas as formas de ação dos trabalhadores de massas, que em uma palavra, a luta sindical se torna um componente de toda a luta de classes do proletariado. .

E, de fato, onde quer que isso tenha sido aplicado na prática, a luta sindical tem sido mais bem-sucedida e mais segura. BLit, para ser fiel à verdade histórica, deve-se admitir que, mesmo quando a luta dos sindicatos é assim combinada, seus limites e chances de sucesso não mudam substancialmente. Mesmo assim, seus resultados, embora substancialmente maiores e mais seguros, ainda permanecem insuficientes e precários. They do not create for the working class in capitalist society the possibility of living well and like cultured men, nor do they even substantially decrease the material and social misery in which it lives.

All improvements obtained through strikes , on the one hand, and through labour protection laws , on the other, as long as political power is in the hands of the bourgeoisie, cannot exceed the limits of a given amount of capitalist profit, as otherwise the very existence of capitalist industry, would be impossible.

Surveying today the whole history of the struggle of the trade unions, we can see that its only essential and lasting result consists in that the workers have succeeded in resisting the utter exhaustion of their vital forces and in safeguarding themselves against utter physical and moral degeneration to which capitalism is irresistibly pushing them . The trade unions, however, are not in a position to impose sufficient and lasting improvement which would enable the workers' masses to lead a more cultural and happier life for a long period .

4. THE NEW CONDITIONS OF TRADE UNION STRUGGLE.

The World War created conditions which further impede the struggle of the trade unions and substantially lower even the chances of obtaining practical results which it had prior to the war.

First of all, it nullified most of the previous gains in the working conditions of all the belligerent, and even of neutral nations. Everywhere wages far from correspond to the colossal rise in the cost of living. There is a precipice between the nominal and the real wage, i. c. its actual purchasing power. There is an unprecedented rise in the price of the necessities of life and a shortage of them, an acute housing crisis and unprecedented misery for the working masses in the defeated as well as in the victorious countries.

Moreover, the war radically upset all economic life. For four years, almost 45 million people, instead of producing goods, were engaged in a terrible holocaust of destruction. More than 20 million producers of goods left their lives on the battlefields or were disabled, i. e. deprived of their former capacity for work. Flourishing regions in the world were devastated. All reserves of raw materials and foods were swallowed up by the greedy war monster. Vast spaces of land remained uncultivated. Three-quarters of the farm animals were killed. The workers who returned from the battlefields are physically exhausted and morally upset Trade has been completely disorganized. The former relations between the different economic and industrial regions for the exchange of raw materials and finished goods have been discontinued. The means of communication (railroad, shipping and other communications) have been worn out, etc.

As a result of this disorganization of economic life, many branches of industry today are. at a standstill, and others have altogether ceased to function. Mass unemploy-ment is assuming unprecedented proportions in all countries ofthe world.

Today, in the period of liquidation of the World War, which in effect is no liquidation at all but merely a passing over of the war into another stage - into the stage of all imperialist war against the rising international proletarian revolution, capitalism has proved incapable of securing peace among nations, of restoring production and securing the elementary survival of the masses. Crushed by the weight of its insoluble internal contradictions, its only concern now is to save itself from the revolution, resorting for this purpose to civil war and thereby fanning still further the chaos in production and economic fife and infinitely increasing the sufferings of its own people.

On the other hand, the World War irretrievably ushered in the epoch of the international proletarian revolution. We see its beginning flow in Soviet Russia. The revolutionary movements which have already started in Germany, Austria and Hungary, as well as the intensified undercurrents in Italy, France and Great Britain, whose echo reaches our ears from time to time, testify to its early spread to other countries as well.

Anarchy in economic life, disorganization in production accompanied by mass unemployment and misery are still further heightened by the civil war, whereby the bourgeoisie is trying in vain. to retain its shaken supremacy.

There are no longer any prospects for a return to prewar conditions. The war itself accelerated and revealed the complete bankruptcy of the capitalist system of production and trade, of social organization and state government.

History now confronts working mankind with the dilemma: either to pass over to new forms of production and social organization or to perish under the regime of imperialist barbarity . The restoration of economic life today is possible only along socialist lines, i. e. without the capitalists and against them.

But precisely under these new conditions, the efforts of the trade unions to improve the conditions of the workers even back to the pre-war level have become quite hopeless and helpless . Within the framework of the capitalist system this is excluded . For its attainment, the first condition to break and go beyond this framework.

And indeed, how will the trade unions be able to obtain the improvements needed by the workers when economic life today is so upset, when there is such mass unemployment and when the strong and extremely obdurate financial capitalists, whom the war even in our small backward country, raised to the position of absolute rulers and lords in economic life, are inclined to see in every movement for higher wages and shorter working hours a revolutionary action , aimed directly at the overthrow of capitalist rule? What labour laws of a nature to expand and consolidate the gains of the trade union struggle could be enacted by the present-day bourgeois state, which is writhing under billions of war debts and is financially bankrupt?

It is, precisely these peculiar conditions in the trade union struggle at the present-day imperialist stage of capitalism which confront the proletariat and, in particular, its trade unions with the immediate task of doing away with the capitalist system and the ensuing exploitation of labour .

The moment is setting in when instead of endeavouring through the trade union struggle slowly and gradually to improve the workers' condition within the limits of capitalist production, production itself has to pass into the hands of the proletariat so as to be organized not for capitalist profit and in favour of a minority, as it is today, but to meet the needs of the working majority and for the general prosperity, of those who work.

5. THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL POWER.

But it is precisely, for this reason that at the present historical moment the struggle for political power by the proletariat comes to the fore and all other efforts and tasks of the workers' organizations, including the trade unions, must be co-ordinated with this struggle and be completely subordinated to it. For the replacement of one social and production system by another is possible only by means of political power. The abolition of capitalist exploitation, which is today the immediate task of the trade unions, can be achieved only if the proletariat wrests power from the hands of the ruling bourgeoisie and establishes a proletarian dictatorship exercised by the workers' councils.

But if the strike is the strongest weapon of the trade unions for gaining improvements in production, now, when it is a question of seizing political power and proceeding to a radical reconstruction of production and society, not the strike , even in the form of a mass political strike, will settle the issue, but the proletarian revolution .

Instead of a struggle with hands crossed by different groups and the masses of workers, we have to have a struggle waged by the whole proletariat, which it will terminate with arms in hand !

To rally the masses, to educate arid prepare them for this struggle, while they themselves take a most active part in it under the leadership of the Communist Party, is today the foremost task of the trade unions, if they wish to remain true to the interests of the proletariat and to their own role of class proletarian organizations.

6. TRADE UNION NEUTRALITY.

In this factual and historical state of affairs, is it necessary to prove in detail that there is no room today for any so-called political neutrality - the neutrality of the trade unions with regard to political parties and political struggles?

Trade union neutrality has always been a purely bourgeois idea. Under the guise of political neutrality, the bourgeoisie and its agents in the workers' movement (the right-wing socialists and the various 'workers' friends' arid social-reformers) have attempted to detach the trade unions from the class struggle of the proletariat and turn them into tools for the maintenance of capitalist rule.

In fact, never and in no country have the trade unions been neutral. The whole history of the workers' movement bears this out. The trade unions have always either remained true to the proletarian cause and have resolutely fought against capitalism, taking part in some way or other in the political struggles in favour of the proletariat, or have directly or indirectly, in one form or another, been at the service of the bourgeoisie, letting the bourgeois parties use them in their internecine struggles for the plums derived from power, and often even in their fight against the emancipatory movement of the proletariat itself.

What in fact the neutrality of the trade unions amounts to was best seen during the World War, when the 'neutral' and 'free' trade unions in Germany, France, Great Britain and America committed their treason towards the cause of proletarian liberation, by taking part with might and main in the bellicose imperialist policy of their own Capitalist classes.

And indeed, call the trade unions be neutral in the struggle between labour and capital, in which by their very nature they are directly involved?

Still less is it possible today, when class contradictions have reached their peak, when the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are pitted against each other as class against class, when the period of the international proletarian revolution has been ushered in, to speak about trade union neutrality.

For the trade unions to be neutral today towards the political class party of the proletariat means for them to be dependent on the bourgeoisie and to be serving some of bourgeois parties.

For the trade unions to be neutral to the workers' revolution which is being implemented means that they will be helping the bourgeois counter-revolution.

Either with labour - against capital; or with capital against labour ! Either on the side of the revolution , or in tile camp of the counter-revolution !

There is no middle road!

And in this connexion the form in which this takes place is of absolutely no significance; what counts is the essence of the matter The fact that certain trade unions are formally considered as neutral and independent means absolutely nothing in fact they cannot be such, and will inevitably go either to the one or to the other side, to the one or to the other of the two fighting camps.

The historical development of the proletarian class struggle has not only refuted all bourgeois fallacies about trade union neutrality and independence towards the political organization and struggle of the proletariat, but also imposes today a still closer unity between the trade unions and the Communist Party, a complete organic unity between the professional and political struggles of the proletariat for the overthrow of capitalism, the setting up of a proletarian dictatorship and the achievement of communism .

7. THE NEW TASKS OF THE TRADE UNIONS.

The example set to us by Soviet Russia where the proletariat has now been exercising its dictatorship for a year and a half and is implementing the country's socialist reconstruction, has shown clearly that the trade unions do not end their historical role and do not cease to exist even when the proletariat has succeeded, through its revolution in seizing political power. On the contrary, precisely during this transitional period of proletarian dictatorship - from the overthrow of the bourgeoisie to the achievement of communism - the trade unions are called upon to play no less important role. Of course, their role now is profoundly different from what they were doing in the period of capitalist production and under bourgeois rule. Here they cease to be organizations of the proletariat against capitalist exploitation, because the capitalists have been removed from production or have been rendered absolutely harmless under the regime of proletarian dictatorship.

True, during this transitional period the trade unions will again continue to defend the workers, but no longer through strikes but through the organized influence of Soviet power . Together with the proletariat, the trade unions themselves, as it were, have come to power i. e. become part of the government, organs of Soviet government .

The trade unions will further have to organize the control and distribution of the work force in the different branches of production, under the general plan worked out by the Soviet Government for the whole nation's economy.

In agreement with the Soviet economic bodies, tile trade unions will be settling questions referring to the wages and conditions of workers in the different enterprises, will maintain labour discipline in them and work for a maximum increase in labour productivity.

The elaboration of the laws, the fixing of working hours wages, hygienic working conditions, against employment accidents, sickness, old age, etc., as well as the application of these laws will be another important function of the trade unions.

Theirs will also he the task of taking care of general and professional education, necessary for the training of a numerous workers' technical intelligentsia, without which neither the complete regulation of production, nor its nationalization and subsequent organization along socialist lines is conceivable.

And, most important of all, the trade unions will be charged with the task of organizing the workers' control over production which will exist until complete socialization is achieved, and of taking into their own hands, as organs of Soviet rule, in conjunction with the other economic bodies, tile organization and management of production and the country's entire economic life.

After the conquest of political power by the proletariat, the trade unions will transfer the centre of their activity to the sphere of the organization of economic life. They will have to prepare the proletariat for the role of organizer of production in the transition from private capitalist monopoly to state monopoly, and from the latter to the socialist organization of economic life and to complete communism .

It will be no exaggeration if we say that without the accomplishment of these exceedingly important tasks oil the part of trade unions, neither a complete nor lasting triumph of the workers' revolution is possible, nor the achievement of communism .

8. CONCLUSION.

The functions of the trade unions prior to the revolution, during the revolution, as well as afterwards during the period of proletarian dictatorship - so important and so complex - imperatively demand that the Bulgarian trade unions become genuine mass organizations in composition and in their ties with the broad workers' masses, restoring the complete trade union unity , and that these masses being firmly welded together, deeply imbued with the ideas and spirit of communism, be fully prepared for the communist revolution and the organized construction of life in the new society.

Our road is indeed not a smooth one. We are still faced with many hard tests.

The great cause to the service of which we have voluntarily dedicated ourselves, however, deserves the utmost efforts and sacrifices on our part.

Let us, therefore, make them without any hesitation, profoundly convinced of the inevitable triumph of the international proletarian revolution and of the fact that all mankind will one day be basking in the sun of communism, which is already shining in the East , quite close to Lis, over vast Russia peopled with many millions of men, with its wonderful purple rays calling to a new life!

1) International , or International Workers' Association , headed by Karl Marx, was founded in 1864.In the declaration of its principles, which became known under the name of Constitutive Manifesto, Marx developed the ideas which had already been exposed in the Communist Manifesto: the International was to be a class organization of the proletariat, fighting for the victory of socialism by wrestling political power from the ruling classes.

2) A General Trade Union Congress was called in Halberstadt om March 14-18, 1892 after the repeat of the exceptional laws against the German socialists. There a general trade union committee under the presidency of Karl Legien was elected, which became the centre of the German trade union movement, as well as a focus of opportunism. The German trade unions pursued a policy of so-called neutrality and were called 'free' trade unions.

3) Wilhelm II (1859-1941) - the last German Emperor and Prussian King, a medicore and narrow-minded politician, known for his pompous and megalomaniacal speeches reflecting the aggressive foreign policy of German imperialism. Compelled to abdicate and flee to Holland (November 9, 1918) after the November Revolution in Germany, Wilhelm II later expressed his solidarity with the nazis and in 1940 hailed the invasion of Holland by Hitler's armies.

4) Germany, Germany above all.

5) The American Federation of Labour (AFL), founded in 1881, compromising mainly the workers' aristocracy under a mercenary clique of revolutionary leaders, such as Gompers up to 1925 (whom Lenin compared to Zubatov), Green and Carey, adopted a hostile attitude to the Russian Revolution. Refusing to join the World Trade Union Federation, it is actively working to split the world trade union movement.

6) Anarcho-syndicalism or self-syndicalism - an anarchistic current sprung up in the 80's, which considered trade unions as the only real class organizations, believed solely in the strike weapon as the natural form of class struggle, and was opposed to the political struggle of the proletariat and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Flourishing at the turn of the century, especially in France, Italy and Spain, this current began to decline after the Russian Revolution.

How unions help all workers.

Briefing Paper #143.

Unions have a substantial impact on the compensation and work lives of both unionized and non-unionized workers. This report presents current data on unions’ effect on wages, fringe benefits, total compensation, pay inequality, and workplace protections.

Some of the conclusions are:

Unions raise wages of unionized workers by roughly 20% and raise compensation, including both wages and benefits, by about 28%. Unions reduce wage inequality because they raise wages more for low - and middle-wage workers than for higher-wage workers, more for blue-collar than for white-collar workers, and more for workers who do not have a college degree. Strong unions set a pay standard that nonunion employers follow. For example, a high school graduate whose workplace is not unionized but whose industry is 25% unionized is paid 5% more than similar workers in less unionized industries. The impact of unions on total nonunion wages is almost as large as the impact on total union wages. The most sweeping advantage for unionized workers is in fringe benefits. Unionized workers are more likely than their nonunionized counterparts to receive paid leave, are approximately 18% to 28% more likely to have employer-provided health insurance, and are 23% to 54% more likely to be in employer-provided pension plans. Unionized workers receive more generous health benefits than nonunionized workers. They also pay 18% lower health care deductibles and a smaller share of the costs for family coverage. In retirement, unionized workers are 24% more likely to be covered by health insurance paid for by their employer. Unionized workers receive better pension plans. Not only are they more likely to have a guaranteed benefit in retirement, their employers contribute 28% more toward pensions. Unionized workers receive 26% more vacation time and 14% more total paid leave (vacations and holidays).

Unions play a pivotal role both in securing legislated labor protections and rights such as safety and health, overtime, and family/medical leave and in enforcing those rights on the job. Because unionized workers are more informed, they are more likely to benefit from social insurance programs such as unemployment insurance and workers compensation. Unions are thus an intermediary institution that provides a necessary complement to legislated benefits and protections.

It should come as no surprise that unions raise wages, since this has always been one of the main goals of unions and a major reason that workers seek collective bargaining. How much unions raise wages, for whom, and the consequences of unionization for workers, firms, and the economy have been studied by economists and other researchers for over a century (for example, the work of Alfred Marshall). This section presents evidence from the 1990s that unions raise the wages of unionized workers by roughly 20% and raise total compensation by about 28%.

The research literature generally finds that unionized workers’ earnings exceed those of comparable nonunion workers by about 15%, a phenomenon known as the “union wage premium.”

H. Gregg Lewis found the union wage premium to be 10% to 20% in his two well-known assessments, the first in the early 1960s (Lewis 1963) and the second more than 20 years later (Lewis 1986). Freeman and Medoff (1984) in their classic analysis, What Do Unions Do? , arrived at a similar conclusion.

Table 1 provides several estimates of the union hourly wage premium based on household and employer data from the mid - to late 1990s. All of these estimates are based on statistical analyses that control for worker and employer characteristics such as occupation, education, race, industry, and size of firm. Therefore, these estimates show how much collective bargaining raises the wages of unionized workers compared to comparable nonunionized workers.

The data most frequently used for this analysis is the Current Population Survey (CPS) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which is most familiar as the household survey used to report the unemployment rate each month. The CPS reports the wages and demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, race, marital status) of workers, including whether workers are union members or covered by a collective bargaining contract, and employment information (e. g., industry, occupation). Using these data, Hirsch and Macpherson (2003) found a union wage premium of 17.8% in 1997. Using data from a different, but also commonly used, household survey—the Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)—Gundersen (2003) found a union premium of 24.5%. So, estimates from household surveys that allow for detailed controls of worker characteristics find a union wage premium ranging from 15% to 25% in the 1990s.

Another important source of workplace information, employer surveys, has advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, wages, occupation, and employer characteristics—including the identification of union status—are considered more accurate in employer-based data. The disadvantage is that data from employers do not include detailed information about the characteristics of the workers (e. g. education, gender, race/ethnicity). However, the detailed occupational information and the skill ratings of jobs (education requirements, complexity, supervisory responsibilities) used in these studies are most likely adequate controls for “human capital,” or worker characteristics, making the surveys reliable for estimating the union wage premium.

Pierce (1999a) used the new Bureau of Labor Statistics survey of employers, the National Compensation Survey, to study wage determination and found a union wage premium of 17.4% in 1997. Pierce’s study was based on observations of 145,054 nonagricultural jobs from 17,246 different establishments, excluding the federal government.

In another study, Pierce (1999b) used a different employer survey—the Employment Cost Index (ECI), a precursor to the National Compensation Survey—and found a union wage premium of 20.3%. This estimate is for all nonagricultural employers except the federal government, the same sector employed in Pierce’s NCS study (though for an earlier year—1994).

These two estimates of the union wage premium from employer surveys provide a range of 17% to 20%, consistent with the range identified by the household surveys. Thus, a variety of sources show a union wage premium of between 15% and 20%.

Since unions have a greater impact on benefits than wages (see Freeman 1981), estimates of the union premium for wages alone are less than estimates of the union premium for all compensation (wages and benefits combined). That is, estimates of just the wage premium understate the full impact of unions on workers’ pagamento. A 1999 study by Pierce estimates the union premium for wages at 20.3% and compensation at 27.5% in the private sector (see Table 1). Thus, the union impact on total compensation is about 35% greater than the impact on wages alone. (A later section reviews the union impact on specific fringe benefits such as paid leave, health insurance, and pensions.)

Many “measurement issues” have been raised about estimates of the union wage premium. Some researchers have argued that union wage premiums are significantly underestimated by some measurements. Hirsch (2003), in particular, raises an important question regardi.

ng the rising use of “imputations” in the CPS. Information is “allocated,” or “imputed,” to a respondent in the CPS when they either refuse to report their earnings or a proxy respondent is unable to report earnings. Hirsch reports that earnings were imputed for fewer than 15% of the CPS in the 1980s but 31% in 2001. The method of imputing earnings to workers for whom earnings aren’t reported does not take account of their union status, thus reducing the estimates of the union wage premium. The increase in imputations has, Hirsch says, created an increasing underestimate of the union wage premium. Table 1 shows Hirsch’s estimates for the union premium in the private sector using traditional methods (18.4%) and using a correction for imputation bias (23.2%). Hirsch’s results imply that imputations depress estimates of the union wage premium for 1997 by 20%, and that the union wage premium is actually one-fourth higher than conventional estimates show.

Union wage premiums and inequality.

Historically, unions have raised the wages to a greater degree for “low-skilled” than for “high-skilled” trabalhadores. Consequently, unions lessen wage inequality. Hirsch and Schumacher (1998) consider the conclusion that unions boost wages more for low - and middle-wage workers, a “universal finding” of the extensive literature on unions, wages, and worker skills. As they state:

The standard explanation for this result is that unions standardize wages by decreasing differentials across and within job positions (Freeman 1980) so that low-skilled workers receive a larger premium relative to their alternative nonunion wage.

The larger union wage premium for those with low wages, in lower-paid occupations and with less education is shown in Table 2 . For instance, the union wage premium for blue-collar workers in 1997, 23.3%, was far larger than the 2.2% union wage premium for white-collar workers. Likewise, the 1997 union wage premium for high school graduates, 20.8%, was much higher than the 5.1% premium for college graduates. Gundersen (2003) estimated the union wage premium for those with a high school degree or less at 35.5%, significantly greater than the 24.5% premium for all workers.

Card’s (1991) research provides a comprehensive picture of the impact of unions on employees by estimating the union wage premiums by “wage fifth,” where the sample is split into five equal groups of workers from the lowest wage up to the highest wage workers. As Table 2 shows, the union wage premium was far greater among low-wage workers (27.9%) than among middle-wage (18.0%) or the highest-wage workers (10.5%).

Unions reduce wage inequalities because they raise wages more at the bottom and in the middle of the wage scale than at the top. Lower-wage, middle-wage, blue-collar, and high school educated workers are also more likely than high-wage, white-collar, and college-educated workers to be represented by unions (see Table 2). These two factors—the greater union representation and the larger union wage impact for low - and mid-wage workers—are key to unionization’s role as a major factor in reducing wage inequalities (see Freeman 1980, 1982; and Freeman and Medoff 1984).

That unionization lessens wage inequality is also evident in the numerous studies that attribute a sizable share of the growth of wage inequality since 1979 to the erosion of union coverage (Freeman 1991; Card 1991; Dinardo et al. 1996; Blackburn et al. 1991; Card et al. 2003; Blanchflower and Bryson 2002). Several studies have shown that deunionization is responsible for at least 20% of the large increase in wage inequality (Mishel et al. 2003). This is especially the case among men, where steep declines in unionization among blue-collar and non-college-educated men has led to a rise in education and occupational wage gaps. Farber’s (2002) estimate shows that deunionization can explain as much as 50% of the growth in the wage gap between workers with a college education and those with a high school education.

Unions and fringe benefits.

In and earlier era, non-wage compensation was referred to as “fringe benefits.” However, items such as adequate health insurance, a secure retirement pension, and sufficient and flexible paid leave to manage work and family life are no longer considered “fringe” components of pay packages. Thus, the union impact on benefits is even more critical to the lives of workers now than in the past. This section presents evidence that unionized workers are given employer-provided health and pension benefits far more frequently than comparable nonunion workers. Moreover, unionized workers are provided better paid leave and better health and pension plans.

The previous section reviewed data that showed that unions have had a greater impact in raising benefits than in raising wages. This section examines the union effect on particular benefits, primarily paid leave, health insurance, and pensions. Unions improve benefits for nonunionized workers because workers are more likely to be provided particular benefits and because the specific benefits received are better.

Table 3 provides information from the employer survey (the ECI) about the impact of unions on the likelihood that a worker will receive benefits. The table shows that unionized workers are 3.2% more likely to have paid leave, a relatively small impact, explained by the fact that nearly all workers (86%) already receive this benefit. Unions have a much greater impact on the incidence of pensions and health insurance benefits, with union workers 22.5% and 18.3% more likely to receive, respectively, employer-provided pension and health benefits.

Table 3 also shows the union impact on the financial value of benefits, including a breakdown of how much the greater value is due to greater incidence (i. e., unionized firms are more likely to offer the benefit) or to a more generous benefit that is provided.

Union workers’ paid leave benefits are 11.4% higher in dollar terms, largely because of the higher value of the benefits provided (8.0% of the total 11.4% impact). Unions have a far larger impact on pensions and health insurance, raising the value of these benefits by 56% and 77.4%, respectively. For pensions, the higher value reflects both that unionized workers are more likely to receive this benefit in the first place and that the pension plan they receive is generally a “richer” 1. For health benefits, the value added by unions mostly comes from the fact that union workers receive a far more generous health plan than nonunionized workers. This factor accounts for 52.7% of the total 77.4% greater value that organized workers receive.

Table 4 provides further information on the union premium for health insurance, pensions, and paid leave benefits, drawn from a different data source (a series of supplements to the CPS) than for Table 3.1 The first two columns compare the compensation characteristics in union and nonunion settings. The difference between the union and nonunion compensation packages are presented in two ways: unadjusted (the difference between the first two columns) and adjusted (differences in characteristics other than union status such as industry, occupation, and established size). The last column presents the union premium, the percentage difference between union and nonunion compensation, calculated using the adjusted difference.

These data confirm that a union premium exists in every element of the compensation package. While 83.5% of unionized workers have employer-provided health insurance, only 62% of nonunionized workers have such a benefit. Unionized workers are 28.2% more likely than comparable nonunion workers to be covered by employer-provided health insurance. Employers with unionized workforces also provide better health insurance—they pay an 11.1% larger share of single worker coverage and a 15.6% greater share of family coverage. Moreover, deductibles are $54, or 18%, less for unionized workers. Finally, unionized workers are 24.4% more likely to receive health insurance coverage in their retirement.

Similarly, 71.9% of unionized workers have pensions provided by their employers, while only 43.8% of nonunion workers do. Thus, unionized workers are 53.9% more likely to have pension coverage. Union employers spend 36.1% more on defined benefit plans but 17.7% less on defined contribution plans. As defined benefit plans are preferable—they provide a guaranteed benefit in retirement—these data indicate that union workers are more likely to have better pension plans.

Union workers also get more paid time off. This includes having 26.6% more vacation (or 0.63 weeks—three days) than nonunion workers. Another estimate, which includes vacations and holidays, indicates that union workers enjoy 14.3% more paid time off.

Union wages, nonunion wages, and total wages.

There are several ways that unionization’s impact on wages goes beyond the workers covered by collective bargaining to affect nonunion wages and labor practices. For example, in industries and occupations where a strong core of workplaces are unionized, nonunion employers will frequently meet union standards or, at least, improve their compensation and labor practices beyond what they would have provided if there were no union presence. This dynamic is sometimes called the “union threat effect,” the degree to which nonunion workers get paid more because their employers are trying to forestall unionization.

There is a more general mechanism (without any specific “threat”) in which unions have affected nonunion pay and practices: unions have set norms and established practices that become more generalized throughout the economy, thereby improving pay and working conditions for the entire workforce. This has been especially true for the 75% of workers who are not college educated. Many “fringe” benefits, such as pensions and health insurance, were first provided in the union sector and then became more generalized—though, as we have seen, not universal. Union grievance procedures, which provide “due process” in the workplace, have been mimicked in many nonunion workplaces. Union wage-setting, which has gained exposure through media coverage, has frequently established standards of what workers generally, including many nonunion workers, expect from their employers. Until, the mid-1980s, in fact, many sectors of the economy followed the “pattern” set in collective bargaining agreements. As unions weakened, especially in the manufacturing sector, their ability to set broader patterns has diminished. However, unions remain a source of innovation in work practices (e. g., training, worker participation) and in benefits (e. g., child care, work-time flexibility, sick leave).

The impact of unions on wage dynamics and the overall wage structure is not easily measurable. The only dimension that has been subject to quantification is the “threat effect,” though measuring this phenomenon is a difficult task for several reasons. First, the union presence will likely be felt most in the markets where unions are seeking to organize—the nonunion employers affected are those in competition with unionized employers. These markets vary in nature. Some of these markets are national, such as many manufacturing industries, while others are local—janitors and hotel and supermarket workers. Some markets are defined by the product—what employers sell, such as autos, tires and so on—while other markets are occupational, such as music, carpentry, and acting. Therefore, studies that compare industries cannot accurately capture the economic landscape on which unions operate and do not adequately measure the “threat effect.”

A second difficulty in examining the impact of the “threat effect” on nonunion wages is identifying a measure, or proxy, for the union presence. In practice, economists have used union density, the percentage of an industry that is unionized, as their proxy. The assumption here is that employers in highly organized settings face a higher threat of union organization than a nonunion employer in a mostly unorganized industry. In broad strokes, this is a reasonable assumption. However, taken too literally and simply, union density can be misleading. First, it is not reasonable to consider that small changes in union density—say, from 37% to 35%, or vice-versa—will produce observable changes in nonunion wages. Any measurement of the “threat effect” that relies on small changes in union density will almost surely—and erroneously—yield little or no effect. Second, the relationship between union density and nonunion wages is not linear. Union density is not likely to produce any threat effect until some threshold level of unionization is reached, as much as 30% to 40%. That is, unionization of 20% in a particular industry may have no impact but 40% unionization may be sufficient to make employers aware of union organizing and union pay and practices. Empirically, this means a 20 percentage point change in unionization density from zero to 20 may have no effect, but a change from 20 to 40 will have an effect. Likewise, a union presence of 60% to 70% may provide as strong a threat, or ability to set standards, as unionization of 80% or more. Therefore, the relationship between union density and nonunion wages depends on the level of density: significant effects after a threshold level of density (e. g., 30% to 40%), a greater effect when density is higher, but no continued increase of impact at the highest densities.

The sensitivity of the results to the specification—a linear or nonlinear specification of union density—is seen in studies of the union threat effect. A linear specification assumes that small changes at any level have the same impact, while a nonlinear specification allows the union effect to differ at different levels of unionization—perhaps less at low levels and more at medium or high levels. In an important early study of the “threat effect,” Freeman and Medoff (1981) examined the relationship between union density and nonunion wages and compensation in manufacturing. They found that union density had no association with higher nonunion pay (the relationship was positive but not statistically significant). Mishel (1982) replicated those results (p. 138) but also employed a nonlinear, qualitative specification (Table 4) that found large threat effects: nonunion establishments in industries with union density from 40% to 60% and from 60% to 80% paid 6.5% and 7.3% more, respectively, than nonunion establishments with low union density (0% to 40%).

Farber (2002, 2003) has conducted the most recent analysis of union threat effects, the relationship between union density and nonunion wages across industries, in the private sector. Farber’s analysis, which uses a linear specification of union density (i. e., assumes small changes at any level have an impact), combines sectors where threat effects, if any, are geographic (hotel, construction, and janitorial work) and national (manufacturing). In one analysis, Farber finds a positive threat effect for the 1970s, 1980s, and mid-1990s. For example, the average nonunion worker in an industry with 25% union density had wages 7.5% higher because of unionization’s presence. Farber’s results show a lower, but still significant, threat effect in later years, though the effect on the average nonunion wage has diminished because of the erosion of union density. Farber also shows, not surprisingly, that the threat effect is greater for workers with no more than high school degree but minimal for those with a college degree.

Farber pursues much more stringent tests of the threat effect in models that use “industry fixed effects” in order to ensure that the effect of other industry characteristics are not wrongly being attributed to union density. Farber’s results in this further analysis show a threat effect among all workers in the 1970s and 1980s but not in the 1990s. Nevertheless, threat effects still prevailed across decades for those without high school degrees and for those with high school degrees, and in the 1980s for those with some college education. For example, nonunionized high school graduates (the largest category of workers in the United States) earned 2.0% to 5.5% higher wages in industries with 25% unionization than they did in completely nonunionized industries.

The union effect on total nonunion wages is nearly comparable to the effect of unions on total union wages. Table 5 illustrates the union impact on union, nonunion, and average wages among workers with a high school education. Farber’s stringent model from 1983 estimates that, for high school workers in a 25% unionized industry, the “threat effect” raises the average nonunion wage by 5.0%, thereby lifting the average wage by 3.8%. Assuming that unions have raised the wages of union workers by 20%, this raises the average high school wage by 5% (25% of 20%). The total effect of unions on the average high school wage in this example is an 8.8% wage increase, 3.8 percentage points of which are due to the higher wages earned by nonunion workers and 5.0 percentage points of which are due to the union wage premium enjoyed by nonunionized workers.

Two conclusions can be reached based on these studies. First, unions have a positive impact on the wages of nonunion workers in industries and markets where unions have a strong presence. Second, because the nonunion sector is large, the union effect on the overall aggregate wage comes almost as much from the impact of unions on nonunion workers as on union workers.

Unions and workplace protections.

An extensive array of labor laws and regulations protects workers in the labor market and the workplace. From the National Labor Relations Act and Social Security Act of 1935 to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, labor unions have been instrumental in securing labor legislation and standards. However, beyond their role in initiating and advocating enactment of these laws and regulations, unions have also played an important role in enforcing workplace regulations. Unions have provided labor protections for their members in three important ways: 1) they have been a voice for workers in identifying where laws and regulations are needed, and have been influential in getting these laws enacted; 2) they have provided information to members about workers’ rights and available programs; and 3) they have encouraged their members to exercise workplace rights and participate in programs by reducing fear of employer retribution, helping members navigate the necessary procedures, and facilitating the handling of workers’ rights disputes (Weil 2003; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Freeman and Rogers 1999).

Unions have played a prominent role in the enactment of a broad range of labor laws and regulations covering areas as diverse as overtime pay, minimum wage, the treatment of immigrant workers, health and retirement coverage, civil rights, unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation, and leave for care of newborns and sick family members. Common to all of these rules is a desire to provide protections for workers either by regulating the behavior of employers or by giving workers access to certain benefits in times of need (Weil 2003; Davis 1986; Amberg 1998). Over the years, these rules have become mainstays of the American workplace experience, constituting expressions of cherished public values (Gottesman 1991; Freeman and Medoff 1984).

Less well recognized perhaps, is the important role that unions play in ensuring that labor protections are not just “paper promises” at the workplace. Government agencies charged with the enforcement of regulations cannot monitor every workplace nor automate the issuance of insurance claims resulting from unemployment or injury. In practice, the effectiveness of the implementation of labor protections depends on the worker’s decision to act. This is done either by reporting an abuse or filing a claim. Unions have been crucial in this aspect by giving workers the relevant information about their rights and the necessary procedures, but also by facilitating action by limiting employer reprisals, correcting disinformation, aggregating multiple claims, providing resources to make a claim, and negotiating solutions to disputes on behalf of workers (Freeman and Rogers 1999; Weil 2003; Hirsch, et al. 1997).

Evidence of the vital role of unions in implementing labor protections can be found in the research on various programs and benefits. Union membership significantly increases the likelihood that a worker will file a claim or report an abuse. Examples of this research can be found in such areas as unemployment insurance, worker’s compensation, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Family Medical Leave Act, pensions, and the Fair Labor Standards Act’s overtime provision.

Unemployment insurance (UI) is a joint federal and state program that was created in the Social Security Act of 1935 to provide some income replacement to workers who lose their job through no fault of their own. Budd and McCall (1997) offer a cost-benefit decision-making analysis to explain the costs facing the unemployed worker in filing a UI claim. In a system with complex eligibility rules and benefit calculations and a lack of uniformity among states regarding these rules, the difficulty, or “cost,” of obtaining information is formidable. In fact, the main reason that many unemployed workers never file a claim is because they thought they were not eligible (Wandner and Stettner 2000). The threat of an employer retaliating by not rehiring a laid-off worker might be another cost weighing on the decision to file a claim. Unions can help offset the costs of workers who are laid off.

Primarily, unions provide information to workers about benefit expectations, rules, and procedures, and dispel stigmas that might be attached to receiving a social benefit. Unions also can negotiate in their contracts layoff recall procedures based on seniority and protection against firing for other than a just cause, as well as help workers build files in the case of a disputed claim (Budd and McHall 1997). Additionally, the union-wage differential reduces the likelihood that unemployed workers will be ineligible for benefits because their pay is too low (Wenger 1999).

Budd and McHall (1997) have estimated that union representation increases the likelihood of an unemployed worker in a blue-collar occupation receiving UI benefits by approximately 23%. At the peak of UI coverage in 1975, one in every two unemployed workers received UI benefits. By the mid-1980s, the ratio of claims to unemployed workers (the recipiency rate) had fallen to almost 30%. Blank and Card (1991) found that the decline in unionization explained one-third of the decline in UI recipiency over this period. These findings underscore the difference unions make in ensuring that the unemployment insurance system works. Considering that UI acts as a stabilizer for the economy during times of recession, the role of unions in this program is pivotal (Wandner and Stettner 2000).

Laws governing workers’ compensation are primarily made at the state level (with the exception of federal longshoremen), but they generally form an insurance system in cases where a worker is injured or becomes ill at the workplace. The employer is liable in the system, regardless of fault, and in return they are protected from lawsuits and further liability. Once again, lack of information about eligibility and the necessary procedures for filing a claim forms the greatest obstacle to receipt of benefits. Fear of employer-imposed penalties and employer disinformation are important other factors weighed by workers deciding whether to act.

As with unemployment insurance, unions provide information to workers through their representatives, and they often negotiate procedures to handle indemnity claims. Through grievance procedures and negotiated contracts, unions protect workers from employer retaliation and, furthermore, act to dispel the notion among workers that employer retaliation is commonplace (Hirsch et al. 1997).

Hirsch et al. (1997) found that, after controlling for a number of demographic and occupational factors, union members are 60% more likely to file an indemnity claim than nonunion workers. Employers and the private insurance companies that sell worker’s compensation insurance policies have mutual interests in denying claims to limit costs (Biddle 2001). According to Biddle, higher denial rates lead to lower claim rates. The robust finding of Hirsch et al. demonstrates that unions provide a needed counterbalance to this interest.

Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)

The Occupation Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) provided the foundation for the Occupation Safety and Health Administration, which enforces safety and health standards at places of work. The administration’s purpose is to limit work-related injury, illness, and death due to known unsafe working conditions. They currently have only 2,100 inspectors to monitor over seven million establishments. Enforcement of OSHA regulations presents an obvious challenge; OSHA implementation requires worker action to initiate complaints.

In two studies of OSHA and unions in the manufacturing and construction industries (1991a and 1991b), Weil found unions greatly improve OSHA enforcement. In the manufacturing industry, for example, the probability that OSHA inspections would be initiated by worker complaints was as much as 45% higher in unionized workplaces than in nonunion ones. Unionized establishments were also as much as 15% more likely to be the focus of programmed or targeted inspections in the manufacturing industry. In addition, Weil found that in unionized settings workers were much more likely to exercise their “walkaround” rights (accompanying an OSHA inspector to point out potential violations), inspections lasted longer, and penalties for noncompliance were greater. In the construction industry, Weil estimated that unions raise the probability of OSHA inspections by 10%.

In addition to the findings above, Weil notes that the union differential could be even larger if OSHA’s resources were not so limited. He claims, “Implementation of OSHA seems highly dependent upon the presence of a union at the workplace” (Weil 1991a). Following the trend of declining unionization, OSHA claims have dropped from their peak in 1985 of over 71,500 and are currently at close to 37,500 (Siskind 2002; OSHA 2003).

Passed in 1993, the FMLA grants workers 12 weeks of unpaid leave in a 12-month period to care for newborn or newly adopted children, or in case of a personal or family member’s health condition. The leave taker is guaranteed the same or equivalent position upon return. One of the most striking characteristics of the act is that less than an estimated 60% of employees covered by the FMLA are not even aware that it exists. There is also widespread misunderstanding on the part of the employer about whom the act covers and when it applies. There is evidence that this leads employers to reject legally entitled leaves (Budd and Brey 2000).

According to Budd and Brey (2000), union members were about 10% more likely to have heard of the FMLA and understand whether or not they were eligible. Union members were found to have significantly less anxiety about losing their job or suffering other employer-imposed penalties for taking leave. And although the authors did not find union membership significantly increases the likelihood that a worker would take leave, they did find that union members were far more likely to receive full pay for leave taken.

The biggest obstacle to workers exercising their rights under the FMLA—besides the fact that the leave is unpaid rather than paid—is information, since only a very slim majority has even heard of the act. With the exception of a $100 fine for failing to post a notice, employers have little incentive to inform employees of their rights. Unions are one of the few institutions to create awareness about FMLA’s existence and regulations.

This act, passed in 1938, had two main features: first, it established a federal minimum wage. Second, it established the 40-hour work week for hourly wage earners, with an overtime provision of time and a half the hourly wage for work done beyond 40 hours. Trejo (1991) examined the union effect on compliance of the latter part of the FLSA, finding that employer compliance with the overtime pay regulation rose sharply with the presence of a union. He hypothesizes that this result reflects the policing function of unions because unions often report violations to enforcement agencies.

Summary: union impact on workplace protections.

The research evidence clearly shows that the labor protections enjoyed by the entire U. S. workforce can be attributed in large part to unions. The workplace laws and regulations, which unions helped to pass, constitute the majority of the labor and industrial relations policies of the United States. However, these laws in and of themselves are insufficient to change employer behavior and/or to regulate labor practices and policies. Research has shown convincingly that unions have played a significant role in enforcing these laws and ensuring that workers are protected and have access to benefits to which they are legally entitled. Unions make a substantial and measurable difference in the implementation of labor laws.

Legislated labor protections are sometimes considered alternatives to collective bargaining in the workplace, but the fact of the matter is that a top-down strategy of legislating protections may not be influential unless there is also an effective voice and intermediary for workers at the workplace—unions. In all of the research surveyed, no institutional factor appears as capable as unions of acting in workers’ interests (Weil 2003). Labor legislation and unionization are best thought of as complements, not substitutes.

This paper has presented evidence on some of the advantages that unionized workers enjoy as the result of union organization and collective bargaining: higher wages; more and better benefits; more effective utilization of social insurance programs; and more effective enforcement of legislated labor protections such as safety, health, and overtime regulations. Unions also set pay standards and practices that raise the wages of nonunionized workers in occupations and industries where there is a strong union presence. Collective bargaining fuels innovations in wages, benefits, and work practices that affect both unionized and nonunionized workers.

However, this review does not paint a full picture of the role of unions in workers lives, as unions enable due process in the workplace and facilitate a strong worker voice in the broader community and in politics. Many observers have stated, correctly, that a strong labor movement is essential to a thriving democracy.

Nor does this review address how unionism and collective bargaining affect individual firms and the economy more generally. Analyses of the union effect on firms and the economy have generally found unions to be a positive force, improving the performance of firms and contributing to economic growth (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Mishel and Voos 1992; Belman 1992; Belman and Block 2002; Stiglitz 2000; Freeman and Kleiner 1999; Hristus and Laroche 2003; with a dissenting view in Hirsch 1997). There is nothing in the extensive economic analysis of unions to suggest that there are economic costs that offset the positive union impact on the wages, benefits, and labor protections of unionized and nonunionized workers. Unions not only improve workers’ benefits, they also contribute to due process and provide a democratic voice for workers at the workplace and in the larger society.

1. The ECI data and the March CPS supplements show different benefit coverage rates with a union differential in coverage lower in the ECI than the CPS. This may reflect that the CPS reports individuals’ coverage while the ECI reports the coverage of occupational groups in establishments. The ECI overstates nonunion benefit coverage to the extent that uncovered nonunion workers are present in unionized occupation groups.

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Introduction to trade unions.

Find out about trade unions, including what they are and the benefits of being a trade union member.

What a trade union is.

A trade union is an organisation made up of members (a membership-based organisation) and its membership must be made up mainly of workers.

One of a trade union's main aims is to protect and advance the interests of its members in the workplace.

Most trade unions are independent of any employer. However, trade unions try to develop close working relationships with employers. This can sometimes take the form of a partnership agreement between the employer and the trade union which identifies their common interests and objectives.

negotiate agreements with employers on pay and conditions discuss major changes to the workplace such as large scale redundancy discuss members' concerns with employers accompany members in disciplinary and grievance meetings provide members with legal and financial advice provide education facilities and certain consumer benefits such as discounted insurance.

Trade union recognition.

Employers which recognise a union will negotiate with it over members' pay and conditions.

Many recognition agreements are reached voluntarily, sometimes with the help of the Labour Relations Agency.

If agreement can't be reached and the organisation employs more than 20 people, a union may apply for statutory recognition. To do so, it must first request recognition from the employer in writing. If this is unsuccessful, the union can apply to the Industrial Court for a decision.

In considering the union's application, the Court must assess many factors including the level of union membership and the presence of any other unions. Often, the Court will organise a ballot among the affected workforce to decide whether recognition should be awarded. Throughout the process, the emphasis is on reaching voluntary agreement.

Collective bargaining.

If a union is formally recognised by an employer, it can negotiate with the employer over terms and conditions. This is known as 'collective bargaining'.

For collective bargaining to work, unions and employers need to agree on how the arrangement is to operate. They might, for example, make agreements providing for the deduction of union subscriptions from members' wages; who is to represent workers in negotiations and how often meetings will take place.

Both these agreements on procedure and agreements between employers and unions changing the terms applying to workers (like a pay increase for example) are called 'collective agreements'.

Your contract of employment will probably set out which collective agreements cover you.

It's possible that a union may negotiate on your behalf even if you're not a member.

Joining a trade union.

Some workers join a trade union because they believe that a union can:

negotiate better pay negotiate better working conditions, like more holidays or improved health and safety provide training for new skills give general advice and support.

Union members have the right to be accompanied to a discipline or grievance hearing by a trade union representative (although trade unions are not compelled to provide this). All employees, regardless of whether they are union members or not, are entitled to be accompanied by a work colleague.

Recognised unions also have rights to consultation where redundancies or a transfer of business are proposed. There is a regular subscription cost for union membership and different rates may apply to trainees and part-timers. Unions will not normally help with problems which pre-date membership.

How to join a union.

If you want to join a recognised union in your workplace, you could approach a representative for information like the shop steward. Otherwise, contact the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) to find out which union is relevant to you.

Trade union-related rights.

The law gives you the right to join a trade union wherever you work. This right applies whether a union has been recognised or not. You're protected from being disadvantaged for being a union member. Specifically trade union membership is an unlawful reason for:

refusing you employment dismissing you selecting you for redundancy.

The law gives you the right not to join a trade union. The same protection applies to you as it does to union members. In particular, employers are not permitted to operate a 'closed shop' (that is, make all workers join the employer's preferred union). An employer can't deduct payments from you, to a union or charity in lieu of union membership without your permission.

Blacklisting.

You can’t be discriminated against because you are in a union or because of your union activity.

With rare exceptions, it’s also illegal to compile, use, sell or supply a ‘blacklist’ of union members that will be used to discriminate against you.

Trade union activities.

When a union is recognised by an employer, members have the right to time off at an appropriate time to take part in trade union activities. These may include:

voting in ballots on industrial action voting in union elections meeting to discuss urgent matters attending the annual conference.

You don’t have the right to be paid for any time spent taking industrial action.

Where you can get help.

The Labour Relations Agency (LRA) offers free, confidential and impartial advice on all employment rights issues.

Helpline 028 9032 1442 (Monday to Friday 9.00 am to 5.00 pm)

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